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To File or Not to File: The Practical and Ethical
Implications of Motion Practice on Sentence
Negotiations* in Capital Cases
Herman J. F. Hoying"
I.L Irxiw
It is well-established in American jurisprudence that an attorney owes a
duty, both to her client and to the legal system, "to represent [her] client zeal-
ously within the bounds of the law."' This principle of zealous representation
is equally applicable and especiallyimportant in the context of criminal defense,
where the client's libertyinterest is at stake.2 Manyscholars have questioned the
ability of criminal defense attorneys to carry out this duty within the current
framework of the criminal justice system. Most notably, in Abraham Blumberg's
* The phrases sentence negotiations" and "sentence bag n" are used in this Article
to describe the ba4gainin process in capital cases wherebythe capit dnse atorneyattempts to
reach a "sentence agreement" with the prosecutor that removes the possibility of a death sentence
from the case. This is generallyachieved in one of the following two ways: (1) both sides agreeing
to a plea of guilty for a noncapital offense or (2) proceeding to trial for a capital offense with the
agreement of the prosecutor not to seek a death sentence. The procedures and pressures faced by
capital defense attorneys in reaching sentence agreements for their clients are qualitativelythe same
as those faced by all criminal defense attorneys seeking to reach plea agreements. Thus, the legal
scholarship discussed in this Article relating to plea bargaining is directly applicable to the context
of sentence bargaining.
** JD. Candidate, May 2003, Washington & Lee University School of Law, BA, North-
western University.
1. MODEL CODE OFPROF'L RESPO1SIBaT EC 7-1 (1981); seeaio MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble (1983) (stating that lawyr "should be competent, prompt and
diligent"); CIARLES W.WOFRAM, MODERNLEGALEThICS S 103, at 578 (1986) (stating that "the
American lawyer's professional model is that of zeal").
2. Se e, , ABA STANDARDS FOR OvUmNAL JLrSCE: PROSEc1YToN FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4-12(b) (3rd ed. 1992) ("STANDARDSFORCRUM.JLT.") (establish-
ing dutyto serve client "with courage and devotion and to render effective, qualityrepresentation");
Von Mokke v. Gillies, 332 US. 708,725-26 (1948) (finding that right to counsel guaranteed bySixth
Amendment requires "[u]ndivided allegiance and faithful, devoted service").
3. Si gmeraaly David L. Bazelon, The Dqe'w Assistaxe cfCQma 42 U. ON. L REV. 1
(describing systemic and practical factors leading to poor qualkyof criminal defense representation);
see also MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 80-81 (1978) (concluding that defense attorney's
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1967 article, "The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession," the author reasoned that the structure of the
criminal justice system created a set of interests and priorities for criminal
defense attorneys that conflicted with their dutyof zealous representation to their
clients.4 Bhunberg concluded that defense attorneys have "far greater profes-
sional, economic, intellectual and other ties to the various elements of the court
system" than to their own clients and, as a result, resolve this conflict bybecom-
ing "agent-mediators who help the accused redefine his situation and restructure
his perceptions concomitant with a plea of guilty."'
This Article examines the implications of this potential conflict between an
attorney's dutyof zealous representation and the systemic pressures and interests
on defense counsel's motion practice in capital cases. In Part HI, the Article
evaluates Blumberg's analysis and its applicability to the motion practice of
capital defenders. Part III of the Article parses out the ethical and legal con-
straints on an attorney's autonomyovermotion practice and sentence bargaining.
In Part IV, these constraints are used to evaluate the merit of the factors consid-
ered by capital defense attorneys in formulating motion practice and sentence-
bargaining strategies. Finally, in Part V, the Article examines the interplay
between negotiation strategy and motion practice, addressing the potential
conflict arising between a capital defender's zealous motion practice and
sentence-bargaining strategy.
It The. A ppl k 'Bhwivgs A msis to
dz Mat Pmaie cf Cap Do&&?s
In his article, Blumberg concluded that the personal interests and time
pressures established by the criminal justice system lead defense attorneys to
focus on "strategies which tend to lead to a plea" instead of the zealous, ad-
versarial representation of their clients." Because defense attorneys are repeat
players in the criminal justice system, Blumberg argued, it is essential for them
to maintain a positive relationship with the other repeat players in the court
system--such as the prosecutors and the judges- in orderto obtain, maintain and
build a successful legal practice! These pressures coupled with the defense
attorney's strong professional, economic, intellectual and other ties to the other
players in the court system result in an institutional focus on cooperation.' The
accused, thus, becomes a "secondary figure" in the court system as the defense
"resolve to remain a firm adversary begins to crunble" in response to sanctions from court, time
and resource pressures and friendly ties with prosecutors).
4. Abraham S. Blmberg, 71PntcdwqLawx Cafu Gin OzA6%nd Cxtadumf
aPf rs , 1 LAw &SocYREv. 15,20-23 (1967).
5. Id at 20-21.
6. M at 23.
7. Id at 21.
8. Id at 21-24.
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attorney focuses on "the rational, impersonal elements involving economies of
time, labor, [and] expense."' This institutional focus on cooperation is magnified
bythe "intolerably large caseloads" and insufficient resources that plague most
prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys and lead to increased pressure for
cooperation and plea bargaining." According to Blumberg, these professional
interests and constraints on time and resources combine to form a system in
which defense attorneys and prosecutors "rely upon one another's cooperation
for their continued professional existence, and so the bargaining between them
tends usuallyto be 'reasonable' rather than fierce."" The defense attorney, thus,
becomes a "double agent," maintaining the role and appearance of a fearless
advocate for her client when, in fact, she is working within the system to limit the
scope and duration of the client's case by negotiating a plea agreement and
convincing the client to accept it.12
Although most acknowledge the accuracy of many of Blumberg's observa-
tions about the systemic challenges and pressures facing criminal defense attor-
neys, Blumberg's assessment of the impact of these challenges and pressures on
the performance of attorneys has drawn substantial criticism.13 Blumberg's
analysis fails to address four keyissues. First, Blumberg fails to acknowledge and
explain the existence and role of criminal defense attorneys "committed profes-
sionallyand ideologicallyto obtaining the best possible results for their clients. "
Although, as Blumberg noted, the vast majority of criminal convictions are the
result of guilty pleas," Blumberg fails to offer any explanation for the many
9. Id at 21, 23.
10. Blumbeig, s"qra note 4, at 22.
11. Id at 24.
12. Id at 28.
13. Sw, eg, RodneyJ. Uphoff, 7he Gi DfeeLa Zadoa A dwow DaoieA ̂  or
BdaqaEiDaded?, 28 QRM. LAW. BUL 419,425-31 (1992) [hereinafter Uphoff, Zedzw Adwrwt
(acknowledging existence of systemic pressures discussed byBumberg, but crizing Bhmberg's
conclusion). But ses"a note 3 and accompanying text (discussing legal scholarship challenging
effectiveness of criminal defense lawrs).
14. Uphoff, ZeadJaAdmrae, s"qr note 13, at 427. For this proposition, Uphoff cited studies
of the public defender system in Wisconsin and Cook County, Illinois showing that the public
defenders in those systems demonstrated a high levelof dedication and provided qualityrepresenta-
tion. Id
15. Bhumberg, s"qm note 4, at 18 (noting that "[t]he overwhelming majorityof convictions
icriminal cases (usually over 90 percent) are not the product of a combative, trial-byjuryprocess
at all but instead merely involve the sentencing of the individual after a negotiated, baagained-for
plea of guilty has been entered"); se abso US. DEPARTMENT OF JLUCE, COMPENDIUM OF
FEDERAL JUST[CE STATISTICS, 2000 2, atvail at http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfJsOO.pdf
(August 2002) (stating that 95% of federal criminal defendants pleaded guiltyin 2000, up from 88%
in 1990); VIRGINIA CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 10, audaHeat
http-J/www.vcsc.state.va.us/200lAmualReportpdf (December 1, 2001) (stating that approximately
83% of all Virginia sentencing guidelines cases were sentenced based on guiltypeas).
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remaining cases, which result in full trials.16 In addition, Blumberg's discussion
of the dose relationship between the criminal defense attorney, prosecutor and
judge in criminal cases focuses solely on the potentially negative impact this
relationship might have on the defense attorney's representation of her client.
He neglects to address the positive impact this relationship might have on her
abilityto represent the accused. 7 Finally, Blumberg completely fails to address
the value of plea agreements or acknowledge that a plea agreement often is in the
best interest of the client.
A recognition of these keypoints suggests Blumberg's conclusion, based on
attorneys' cooperative attitudes and the high proportion of cases ending in plea
agreements, that criminal defense attorneys act as a mediator for the system in
attempting to get their clients to agree to a guiltyplea instead of zealouslydefend-
ing the accused's interests is misplaced. 9 Instead, these four points, when
combined with Blumberg's findings, indicate that criminal defense attorneys
often are committed to the representation of their clients' interests and employ
cooperative tactics and actively plea bargain as a means of advocating these
interests.20 The rejection of Blumberg's conclusion, however, does not require
a rejection of Blumberg's analysis of the systemic pressures and interests facing
criminal defense attorneys in mounting a defense." Moreover, the conclusion
that criminal defense attorneys, in fact, are committed to representing their
clients' interests through cooperative tactics and plea bargaining does not resolve
the tension at the heart of Blumberg's critique: the conflict between the systemic
pressures created by the criminal justice system and zealous advocacy.
The conflict that arises between a defense attorney's zealous representation
of a client and the systemic pressures facing her takes on special significance in
the context of motion practice in capital cases. An essential part of an attorney's
16. Uphoff, Zed=s Adazte s"' note 13, at 427.
17. Se Blumberg, s"pra note 4, at 19-24; Rodney J. Uphoff, 7he Oi Dome Lazoeras
EffcwNexiao.A S)stmicAppMv 2 QaNICALL REV. 73, 90-92 (1995) [hereinafter Uphoff,
EffetizeNeqwat*] (discussing negative impact aggressive motion practice can have on prosecutor's
willingness to negotiate plea with defense attorney).
18. Se Uphoff, Effijx Ngiaor, s"pra note 17, at 82, 87-88 (noting that defendants often
receive harsher sentences if convicted at trial than theywould have received under plea agreement).
19. See Blumberg, s"pra note 4, at 19-20 (contending that criminal defense attorneys are
"coopted to become agent-mediators who hel the accused redefine his situation and restructure
his perceptions concomitant with a plea of guity"); Uphoff, Eff iu e N dtiat, s"ora note 17, at 78
(notig that there are "too manydedicated defense lawyers, too much litigation and too manyother
variables affecting client decisionmaling to conclude that manipulative, complicitous criminal
defense lawyers are the cause of most plea bargaining").
20. S& Uphoff, Effmuw Nqaoq , su"t note 17, at 93 (noting that defense lawyer is placed
in precarious position of attemping "to provide zealous representation in a system geared to the
efficient resolution of cases which, or the most part, means entering into negotiated settlements").
21. Seeid at 78 (finding that Blumberg's analysis accuratelydepicts systemic pressures facing
criminal defense attorneys); Uphoff, Zeiouw Adrat, supra note 13, at 426 (agreeing with
Blumberg's analysis of systemic pressures facing criminal defense attorneys).
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representation of a criminal defendant is the filing of pretrial motions for such
purposes as obtaining discovery, obtaining more specific information on the
charges, challenging the sufficiencyof the indictment and challenging the state's
evidence." The need for a zealous motion practice is heightened in capital cases,
not only because a human life is at stake, but also because the quantity and
complexity of issues that arise are increased.' Also heightened in capital cases
is the systemic pressure and desirability of reaching an agreement with the
prosecutor that removes the possibility of a death sentence. The remainder of
this Article will examine the impact of the systemic pressures and interests
discussed byBlumberg on the motion practice of capital defense attorneys, with
an emphasis on the conflict that arises between conducting a zealous motion
practice and maintaining a strong sentence-bargaining position.
IlL ES idar dLegl Ccntrat on A uum's Mctin
Pra and S~anwaj, A um,"
A frame'work of professional rules and responsibilities governs the conduct
of all attorneys practicing law. The state bar of every state has adopted a set of
standards, generally a variation of the uniform standards promulgated by the
American Bar Association (ABA), to govern the legal practice of its members.
In addition to these binding rules, the ABA also has developed specific standards
to guide the practice of capital defenders and criminal defense attorneys gener-
ally.24 An attorney's conduct also is determined by the rights of her client; a
criminal defense attorney must conform her representation to the requirements
established bythe client's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of
counsel.2 The body of law in each of these areas governs all aspects of the
attorney's representation and thus places constraints on the attorney's autonomy
and authority over motion practice and sentence bargaining.
A. 7Th 0qVRue fmswnd Ccnx
All attorneys practicing law in Virginia are required to abide bythe Virginia
Rules of Professional Conduct, which are modeled after the ABA Model Rules
22. Sw eg, JAMES E. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING & GUILTY PLEAS S 4.19 (2d ed. 1983)
(discussing importance of pr-trial motions); HEU sqmr note 3, at 73-74 (noting potential
benefi to be gained from filing pretrial motions).
23. In addition to the pretrial motions available to the defense atto in al criminal cases,
capital cases present several uniue issues which maybe challenged inp motons, such as the
constitionalityof capitalpunhnt and additional grounds for chaL1ngin the sufficiencyof the
indictment. SeDouglas W. Victlr PowbleJiar Unr/fi rIEd eSeiskaA lbimy
Dwtb Setms, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 358 (1995) (stating that -t]he burdens of pre-trial motion
practice are greater in death cases than other criminal cases," requiring capital defense attorneys to
mae motions unique to capital cases).
24. Sw STANDARDS FOR CRIM.JtMr., sa note 2, Standards 4-1.1-4-8.6.
25. Swegerb notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
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of Professional Conduct. 6 A lawyer's failure to complywith the Rules is "a basis
for invoking the disciplinaryprocess" of the Virginia State Bar, the administrative
agency of the Supreme Court of Virginia responsible for regulating the legal
profession."' Aviolation of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct can result
in the revocation of an attorney's license." Thus, the Virginia Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct are binding constraints on the practice of law in Virginia. Six of
these rules establish the primary constraints on an attorney's autonomy and
authority in the context of motion practice and sentence bargaining.
One of the most basic and fundamental duties of all attorneys, and espe-
ciallyof the criminal defense attorney, is the duty of zealous representation of a
client's interests.29 The duty of zealous representation is embodied in Rule 1.3
of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, which states that a lawyer "shall
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.""0 The
commentaryto the rule expounds on this duty, directing attorneys to "act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advo-
cacy upon the client's behalf."31 The rules recognize, however, that a strictly
adversarial approach will not always be the most effective method for realizing
the multiple aims of representation and, thus, temper the duty of zealous repre-
sentation bystating that a lawyer "is not bound to press for every advantage that
might be realized for a client."32 The rules acknowledge that "a more collabora-
tive, problem-solving approach is often preferable to an adversarial strategy in
pursuing the client's needs and interests." 3 Thus, the dutyof zealous representa-
tion requires an attorney to file motions promptly and diligently in the interest
of her client and, at the same time, to seek actively a sentence agreement in the
best interest of her client.
26. VA. SLP. Cr. R., Part 6, S HI VIRGINIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CNDucr, Preamble
(Miie 2002) (VA. R. PROF'L G LDCr). The Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct were
adopted by the Supreme Gourt of Virginia in 1999 and took effect on January 1, 2000. Id
27. Id Note, however, that "nothing in the Rules should be deemed to augment any
substantive legal duty of lawers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a duty."
Id
28. SeVA. CODE ANN. $54.1-3935 (MIichie 2002) (describing procedure for revocation of
license and listing violation of professional rules as ground for revocation). It is a misdemeanor for
an individual to practice law without a license in Virginia. VA. CODE ANN. §54.1-3904 (Michie
2002).
29. See eg, WOLFRAM, sup note 1, at 585 (stating that 'the American lawyer's professional
modelis that of zeal"); Polk Countyv. Dodson, 454 US. 312,318-19 (1981) (stating that "a defense
lwr best serves the public, not by acting on behalf of the State or in concert with it, but rather
by advancing the undivided interests of his client'"); Uphoff, Zed= Adwam s".a note 13, at 419-
422 (discussing criminal defense attorney's duty of zealous representation).
30. VA. R. PROF'L CONDuc R. 1.3.
31. VA. PROF'L CiucrI B1.3, cmt.[1].
32. Id
33. VA.R.PROF'.GONDUCr 13, cmt.[1a].
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Rule 11 of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provides guidance
for defining the scope of the attorney's representation and for the distribution
of decisionmaking authofitybetween the client and the attorney.4 The rule states
that an attorney "shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation... and shall consult with the client as to the means bywhich they
are to be pursued."3" Although the rule seems to establish the principle that a
client controls the objectives or ends of the representation and the attorney
controls the means of the representation, it is clear from the commentaryon the
rule that this principle is an over-simplified statement of the rule.' Moreover,
the rules acknowledge that there is not always a clear distinction between the
objectives and the means of the representationY Thus, the rules recognize that
"[b]oth lawyer and client have authority and responsibility in the objectives and
means of representation."3" Although Rule 1.2 clearlyestablishes constraints on
the attorney's autonomy and authority over motion practice and sentence bar-
gaining, the precise confines of these constraints remain ambiguous. 9 What is
clear from the rule is that the client must be afforded final authority over the
decision to enter a plea agreement and must be consulted "about the means to
be used in pursuing" the client's objectives.'
In addition to this dutyto consult with one's client about the objectives of
the representation, an attorneyalso has an independent dutyto "explain a matter
to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed deci-
sions regarding the representation."' The rules recognize that it, is impractical
for the attomeyto advise her client of all developments and tactical decisions and
thus advises "that the hwyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for
information consistent with the dutyto act in the client's best interests, and the
client's overall requirements as to the character of representation."42 The attor-
34. VA.i.PROF'LGoNDucri. 1.2.
35. Id In addition, the rule provides that, in criminal cases, the defendant have absolute
authority over the decision "as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the
client will testify." Id




39. Two examples aptlydemonstrate the existence and gravityof these re ingambiguities.
Although the nle expressly places the authority of entering into a plea agreement in the hands of
the client, it is unclear whether the client or the attorney controls the deciion to enter into plea
negotiations. Further, although the comments make clear that a aw~er 'is not required to pursue
objectives or employ means simply because a client may wish that the lawyer do so," it is not clear
whether the attorney or the client has the authority to decide whether or not to file certain motions
that would be determinative of the case if granted. See VA. R. PROF'L ONDUCr R. 12, cmt [11
40. VA.iLPROFLCONDUCrR 1.2, cmt.[1].
41. VA. R PROF'L ODUCr R. 1.4.
42. VA. it PROF'L GONDUCr it 1.4, cmt [2].
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ney should provide the client with "sufficient information to participate intelli-
gentlyin decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means
bywhich theyare to be pursued.""' Thus, in the context of motions practice and
sentence bargaining, the attorney has a duty to inform the client of the pros and
cons of the available motion practice and sentence-bargaining strategies in order
for the client to participate intelligently in the representation.
The final three rules of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct that have
a significant impact on an attorney's motion practice and sentence-bargaining
autonomy and authority govern an attorney's conduct when faced with conflicts
of interest. The general conflict rule is contained in the two provisions of Rule
1.7." The second provision of that rule has a significant impact on an attorney's
motion practice and sentence bargaining, prohibiting an attorneyfrom represent-
ing a client if the representation "may be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own
interests," unless she "reasonablybelieves the representation will not be adversely
affected" and the client "consents after consultation."4 Thus, absent the in-
formed consent of the client, an attorney's motion practice and sentence- bargain-
ing efforts may not be limited bythe attorney's own professional interests or by
her interest in obtaining favorable sentence agreements for other clients. *
Rule 1.8 prohibits an attorney from entering into a number of different
transactions, each on the basis of the conflict inherent therein.47 Although most
of these transactions involve financial interests not applicable to the motion
practice and sentence-bargaining context, two of the provisions of the rule place
constraints on an attorney's sentence-bargaining strategy. According to the
rule, absent informed consent, an attorney may not use information relating to
the representation of a client to bolster her professional relationship with other
repeat playrs in the court system or to aid in obtaining a sentence agreement for
another client.49 The rule also expressly prohibits a criminal defense attorney
43. VA. R. PROF'L CO UCr . 1.4, cmt. [1].
44. VA. R. PROF'L GONDuCr K 1.7. The first provision, which prohibits an attorney from
representing a client if the representation of the client "will be directly adverse to another existing
client," iinless she "reasonably believes the representation will not adverselyaffect" her relationship
with the other client and both clients consent after consultation, is rarely, if ever, applicable in the
context of motions practice and sentence bargaining. VA. R. PROF'! CO tucr K 1.7(a). This
provision of the rule, however, does prohibit the criminal defense attorney from representing co-
defendants, absent express consent, if negotiating a sentence bargain on behalf of one client will
have a directly adverse affect on another client (e.g., a sentence agreenent requiring one client to
testify against the other).
45. VA. R. PROFLC oNucr K 1.7(b).
46. See b16 notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
47. VA. R. PROFF. CNDuCr K 1.8.
48. VA.KPROF .GoL NUCrlR 1.8(b),(g).
49. Se VA. R. PRoF'L CONDuc P, 1.8(b) (proscribing use of information related to
representation 'for the advantage of the lawyer or of a third person or to the disadvantage of the
client unless the client consents after consultation").
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who represents multiple clients from negotiating "an aggregated agreement as to
guilty or nolo contendere pleas unless each client consents after consultation,
includin gdisclosure of the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas in-volved."s
The final rule providing constraints on the criminal defense attorney's
autonomy and authority applies to an attorney whose representation of a current
client is in conflict with the interests of a former client. Rule 1.9 provides that
an attorneywho has formerly represented a client shall not thereaer represent
another client "in the same or a substantiallyrelated matter in which that person's
interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless both
the present and the former client consent after consultation."51 Although this
rule will rarely, if ever, be directly controlling in the context of a criminal case, it
does provide guidance for a criminal defense attorney considering the impact of
her motion practice and sentence-bargaining decisions on future clients.2 The
rule suggests that it is inappropriate for an attorney to allow her representation
to be affected by considerations of former or future clients."
The Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct thus provide substantial
guidance and constraints on an attorney's practice. A criminal defense attorney
must be guided by these principles in conducting her motion practice and
sentence-bargaining efforts or face disciplinarymeasures from the Virginia Bar.-
Although these rules may appear to be quite logical and straightforward in the
abstract, their application can be quite challenging and constrain inthe context
of actual motion practice and sentence bargaining in capital cases.
55
B. TheA BA Stadai for COrirn Jwtice
The ABA developed the Standards for Criminal Justice as "guidelines and
recommendations intended to help criminal justice planners design a system, set
goals and priorities to achieve it, and propose procedures... targeted toward
achieving a criminal justice system that is fair, balanced, and constitutionally
responsive." Although the Virginia Bar has not adopted the Standards, and
thus theyare not binding on Virginia criminal attorneys, the Standards are widely
50. VA. Rt PROF- CONDUCT 1. 1.8().
51. V.R.PROFLONDUCrR 1.9(a).
52. Because a criminal defense attorney's subsequent representation of clients very rarely
involves the same or a substantially related matter to that of a former client and the former and
present clients' interests are even more seldomly adverse to one another, Rule 1.9(a) is very rarely,
if ever, directly applicable to the criminal defense attorney. But sM Micliens v. Taylor, 535 US. 162
(2002) (ineffective assistance of counsel challenge to conviction on basis of conflict of interest
where defense attorney had previously represented victim of crime).
53. Se i#6r notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
54. Sees"gn notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
55. Se i# Part IV.
56. ABA STANDAMs FOR QUMNALJBMnC E xx (2d ed. 1980) (amended 1992).
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recognized as an excellent guidepost for the ethical and effective practice of
criminal law. 7 Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren E. Burger used the following
words to describe the first edition of the Standards:
The Standards are a balanced, practical work intended to walk the fine
line between the protection of societyand the protection of the consti-
tutional rights of the accused individual. Taken as a whole, they can
be utilized by the various states and the federal systern to elevate
criminal justice to a new level-one that is reasonabe workable, and
above allfair. They are valuable tools to undertake the massive task
of overhauling the entire criminal justice system.5
Thus, the Standards offer criminal defense attorneys principles specific to
criminal justice to guide them in conducting ethical and effective motion practice
and sentence bargaining. Although many of these standards parallel the rules
defined in the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, the Standards parse out
those duties in the context of criminal representation and also provide additional
guidelines specific to the criminal justice system.
The Standards for Ciminal Justice, like the Virginia Rules of Professional
Conduct, contain a zealous representation standard, requiring a defense attorney
to advocate "with courage and devotion and to render effective, qualityrepresen-
tation."s Because of the unique "finality" in death penalty cases, the Standards
call for a heightened duty, requiring capital defense attorneys to make "extraordi-
nary efforts on behalf of the accused."6° The Standards also provide defense
attorneys with guidance on the quantity and quality of communication to have
with their clients. 6' These standards suggest that a criminal defense attorney
should keep the defendant abreast of the strategy and progress of the motion
practice and sentence- bargaining efforts and expresslyprohibit the attorneyfrom
exerting "undue influence on the accused's decision as to his or her plea."62 In
addition, the Standards offer a more definitive statement of the allocation of
decisionmaking authoritybetween the defense attorneyand the defendant, stating
that the decisions of what plea to enter, whether to accept a plea agreement,
whether to waive jury trial, whether to testify and whether to appeal are all "to
be made bythe accused after full consultation with counsel," whereas all "strate-
gic and tactical decisions," including what trial motions to make, "should be
57. Seid at xix-xx (discussing national and international recognition and use of Standards).
58. Warren E. Burger, Inridiiar TheABA Stanrdkfor Ctnbfir i , 12 AK. UM. L
REv. 251,252 (1974).
59. STANDARDS FOR GM. JUST., s" note 2, Standard 4-12(b).
60. STANDARDS FOR GU. JusT., su"ra note 2, Standard 4-1.2(c).
61. STANDARDS FOR GUM. JUST., su"r note 2, Standard 4-3.8(a) (establishing defense
attorney duty of informing client of the "developments in the case and the progress of preparing
the defense"); STANDARDS FOR GUM. JMT., sm note 2, Standard 4-5.1(a) describing defense
counsel's duty to advise client "with complete candor concerning all aspects of the case").
62. STANDARDS FOR xM. Jt., sspu note 2, Standard 4-5.1(b).
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made bydefense counsel afterconsultation with the client."63 The Standards also
expand on the duties of a criminal defense attorney faced with a conflict of
interest, providing a more specific and strict restriction on the representation of
co-defendants and a broader, criminal law specific definition of conflict.6 The
Standards recommend that a criminal defense attorneydisclose to the defendant
"any interest in or connection with the case or any other matter that might be
relevant to the defendant's selection of counsel to represent him or her or coun-
sel's continuing representation. " 61 The broad language invoked in this standard
indicates that a criminal defense attorney, as a repeat-player, should disclose her
relationship with other players in the criminal justice system and the impact that
this relationship might have on her motion practice and sentence bargaining."
In addition to these expansions on the principles contained in the Virginia
Rules of Professional Conduct, the Standards for Criminal Justice also contain
two additional provisions relevant to a criminal defense attorney's motion
practice and sentence bargaining. Standard 4-3.5(a) establishes the principle that
the defendant's interests are paramount and considerations of the lawyer's
"political, financial, business, property, or personal interests" should not influ-
ence the lawyer's advice or performance.67 Finally, the Standards for Criminal
Justice establish specific duties for sentence bargaining. Standard 4-6.1 directs
criminal defense attorneys to "explore the possibility" of disposition of the case
without trial, but states that "[u]nder no circumstances" should the attorney
recommend the acceptance of a plea "unless appropriate investigation and study
of the case has been completed."" In addition, the Standards direct the attorney
to advise the accused of all developments in sentence negotiations and proscribe
an attorney from seeking or accepting "concessions favorable to one client by
any agreement which is detrimental to the legitimate interests of a client in
another case."
69
Over the past thirty years, the Standards for Criminal Justice have become
widely accepted and well regarded as a source of guidance for the ethical and
effective practice of criminal law.70 Although not binding on criminal defense
63. STANDARDS FOR CM JUST., sia note 2, Standard 4-52.
64. STANDARDS FORG vLJL.T., supm note 2, Standard 4-3.5(c) (stating that "[t]he potential
forconflict of interest in representing muliple defendants is so grave that ordinarilydefense counsel
should decline to act for more than one of several codefendants"); STANDARDS FOR GUM.JUIST.,
s"mr note 2, Standard 4-3.5(b) (stating that defense counsel should disclose at the earliest feasible
opporuity' information "reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the signifiace
of any conflict or potential conflict of interest").
65. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST., s"ra note 2, Standard 4- 35(b).
66. Sw ifra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
67. STANDARDS FOR UM. JUST., sura note 2, Standard 4- 3.5(a).
68. STANDARDS FOR QUYL JUST., supra note 2, Standard 4-6.1.
69. STANDARDS FOR UM. JUST., spra note 2, Standard 4-62.
70. Se a&, Stricland v. Washington, 466 US. 668, 688 (1984) (finding Standards for
Cziminal Justice to reflect "[plrevailing norms of practice" and to be "guides to determining"
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attomeys, the Standards for Criminal Justice provide ethical and practical guide-
lines that place significant constraints on an attorney's autonomy and authority
over motion practice and sentence bargaining in criminal cases.
C T1,eSixthAmdntRixto
dxEffivi A ssi tam orild
In addition to practicing in conformitywith ethical and professional guide-
lines, criminal defense attorneys also must provide their clients with representa-
tion consistent with their clients' Sixth Amendment right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel.' The universallyrecognized and oft-cited test for the effective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment was established bythe United
States Supreme Court in StiLandv Washi.& n Under the Stridxdstandard,
a defense attorney's performance must be reasonable "under prevailing profes-
sional norms."" 3 Thus, although professional standards and guidelines estab-
lished by organizations such as the ABA are not embodied in the constitutional
standard, they serve as "guides to determining what is reasonable." 4 The Court
in Stidelar also identified certain "basic duties" inherent in the representation
of a criminal defendant including the following duties: to avoid conflicts of
interest, to advocate the defendant's cause, to consult with the defendant on
important decisions, to informthe defendant of important developments and "to
bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial
testing process.""5 Thus, under Stricklan a criminal defendant constitutionally
is entitled to an attorney who will conduct a professionally reasonable motion
practice free from the influence of conflicts of interest and who will inform and
consult with the client about key strategic decisions.
These same constitutional guarantees apply equally to the context of sen-
tence bargaining.7 6 Because the touchstone of the constitutional standard is
whether defense counsel's representation was reasonable);Jones v. Murray, 947 F.2d 1106,1110-11
(4th Gr. 1991) (using Standards as guide to determine whether attorney's conduct violated
professional standards.
71. SeegmullySvicklanr 466 US. at 684-86 (recognizing that "the right to counsel is the
right to the effective assistance of counsel" and that defense counsel deprives defendant of right
to effective assistance "simply by failing to render adequate legal assistance" (internal quotations
omitted)).
72. Seeid at 688-94 (establishing a two-part test, wherebydefendant must showthat counsel's
representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that "there is a reasonable
p0bability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
en differene).
73. Id at 688.
74. Id
75. Id The Court went on to note, however, that "tjhese basic duties neither exhaustively
define the obligations of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney perfor-
mance." Id
76. SwB ill. Lockhart, 474 US. 52,57 (1985) (finding that ineffective assistane of counsel
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reasonableness, in the course of sentence negotiations, a criminal defense attor-
ney must provide a criminal defendant with reasonably sufficient and accurate
information about the sentence offers and a reasonably accurate assessment of
the strength of the defendant's case.' Although the Supreme Court firmly has
established that the ultimate decision of whether or not to plead guilty must rest
in the hands of the criminal defendant," courts have found that a criminal
defense attorney is required "actually and substantially [to] assist his client in
deciding whether or not to plead guilty.""
Because criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel, criminal defense attorneys, under the Sizkaistandard,
are obligated to provide their clients with objectively reasonable representation.
In addition to being guided by commonly accepted principles of professional
responsibility, criminal defense attorneys also must performcertain"basic duties"
in the course of their representation s The Constitution thus places certain
constraints on a criminal defense attorney's motion practice and sentence bar-
gaining efforts, requiring that the attorney conduct these functions in a reason-
ablydiligent manner and free from conflicts of interest, providing the client with
reasonably accurate and sufficient information throughout the process.
IV Faas Irt0"wgA=ttay'sMtixn
Pmam and SetmBag&Tfing Deisi
An attorney is confronted with a seemingly endless number of factors and
considerations in selecting a trial strategy. Among the most important decisions
a criminal defense attorney must make in preparing a case are those concerning
motion practice and sentence bargaining; an attorney's success often hinges on
her ability to argue timely and persuasively a motion or to negotiate effectively
standard established in Soiddard equally is applicable to cases arising out of plea process). See
Vendy Steven Zeidnman, To PlAud or Nct to Plam EJfuize As uita avr-Cat Ceamd 39
B.C L REv. 841, 850-76 (1998) (evaluating constitutional standards governing plea negotiations);
Kekh N. Bystrom, GCrmwsug P/n Q to dx (1a n ETHICAL PROBLEwM FACING THE
C2mNl DEFE IE LAWYER. PRAMCCAL ANSWES TO TOUGH QUEMlONs 84,88 (RodneyJ.
Uphoff, ed. 1995) (discussing constitutional standards for attorneys in plea negotiations).
77. See Zeidman, stqhr note 76, at 853-56.
78. See, eg, Jones v. Barnes, 463 US. 745, 751 (1983) (finding that "the accused has the
ultimate authorityto make certain fundamenta decisions regarding the case, as to 'whether to plead
gulty, waive ajury, testifyin his or her own behalf, or rake an appeal"); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 US.
1, 6-7 (1966) (finding that attorney could not enter "equivalent of a guihy plea" without client's
knowing a intelligent .
79. Walkerv. Cad'welI, 476 F2d 213, 224 (5th Cr. 1973). Most courts have held, however,
that this duty is limited to enab the defendant to make an informed and conscious choice and
does not require the attorney to advise the client on whether or not to accept the plea, even if the
plea, objetively, does not appear to be the best result for the client. Seesrm sy"Zein,ssqVr note
73, at 859-62 (reviewing appellate caes).
80. Seesqmr note 75 and accompanying text.
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a sentence agreement.81 In order ethically and effectively to make decisions
concerning motion practice and sentence bargaining, a criminal defense attorney
must weigh all the factors and considerations confronting herin conformitywith
the ethical and legal constraints discussed above."
A. Perscnal ari C r Ca iravz
Because criminal defense attorneys are repeat playrs in the criminal justice
system, the maintenance of a strong and positive personal and professional
relationship with other players in the criminal justice system can be essential to
a criminal defense attorneys professional success. 3 The maintenance of a
cooperative, positive relationship with the prosecutor and judge will often
provide an attorney with a more enjoyable work environment, facilitate overall
success in negotiating pleas and obtaining favorable court rulings and increase
one's political and professional standing in the community" In addition, the
81. See UphoffEff:wNeriiarsu" note 17, at 104 (stating that "defense counsel's abiy
to raise and to litigate suppression motions effectively is an important factor in defense counsel's
overall effectiveness'); su" note 17 and accompanying text.
82. Sees" Part I.
83. See lphoff, EJff e Nqpdaor, s"qm note 17, at 90-92 (discussing pressures on criminal
defense attorneys to maintainpositive relationship with prosecutor); HEUMAN s note 3, at 61-
69 (describing negative impact aggressive motion prnctice can have on criminal defense attorney's
professional relationship with prosecutors and judges).
84. Because criminal defense attorneys consistently interact with the same prosecutors and
judges, the maintenance of a positive and cordial relationship is lilely to make these repeated
interactions, and thus the attoneys'complete workexpeence, more enjoyable. SeUphoff,Effie
N xia, sqmr note 17, at 92 n.75 (noting that "a prosecutor's broad discretion gives her consider-
able-and virtually unchecked-room to make life miserable for the defense lawyer whose attitude
or conduct arouses the prosecutor's ire"). In addition, scholarlyresearch and psychological theory
indicate that prosecutors and judges are likely to negotiate and interact more favorably with an
attorney with whom they have a cooperative, cordial relationship. See Donald G. Gifford, A
Cmt.Based 7'xmy'StnaZSea:iainLedNeoi 46 OHIOST.LJ. 41,78 (1985) (stating that
prosecutors expect that defense attorneys will b coo " theypunish
attorneys who are too adversarial in representing their clients"); Albeit W. Alschuier, 7Dqie
Airors Rde iPka &iirg 84 YA E LEJ. 1179, 1225 (1975) (ciing evidence that 'rapport' is
the most important determinant of a prosecutor's willingness to disclose information'). Further,
because prosecutors and judges often wield great political and professional power within the legal
community the maintenance of a positive relationship with these figures can provide criminaldefense attorneys with political and professional benefis. Seetphoff, Eff ~eNe80atr smima note
17, at 92 (noting that defense attorney'who is trying to live off of or get byon personal contacts
will not want to offend or alienate fiends on the prosecutors staff'); B supra note 4, at 19-
21 (discussing professional implication for criminal defense attorney in mrintaining positive
relaonship with judges and prosecuors). These effects are especally pronounced in smaller
communities, in which jurisdictions the Commonwath's Attorneys are more likely to seek the
death penalty against the accused. S e y DONAD D. LANDON, CoUN Y LAWYES: T1iE
IMPACrOFCONEXTONPROFESSIONALPACnCE 145 (1990);JOINrLEGIS.AUDITAND REVIEW
COMM'N, REVEWOF VIRGINIA'S SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 32 fig. 11, 39 fig. 15 (2002)
(finding that Commonwealth's Attorneys in low and medium density locations sought capital
murder conviction and penalty significamly more than those in high density jurisdictions).
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maintenance of this positive relationship can increase the success of an attorney's
practice by increasing the quantity and quality of appointments the attorney
receives in jurisdictions in which the judge appoints defense counsel for indigent
defendants and establishing a positive reputation for successful plea negotia-
tions."' Because an active and aggressive motion practice and sentence-bargain-
gstrategycan frustrate and burden judges and prosecutors and thus strain this
elationship, personal and career considerations often weigh against the adoption
of an active and aggressive strategy by criminal defense attorneys.
6
A recognition of these factors led Blumberg to conclude that criminal
defense attorneys act as "double agents," appearing in the role of a zealous
advocate for her client, but in reality working vitb the other players in the crimi-
nal justice systemto arrange a plea agreement.8 7 Legal scholars suggest, however,
that most criminal defense attorneys do not allow these personal and career
considerations to impact their representation of clients.88 Moreover, the Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice prohibit criminal defense attorneys from allowing
considerations of personal and professional advantage to influence their repre-
sentation."' In addition, the attomeymaynot allowthese personal considerations
to interfere with her ethical and constitutional duties of diligent and reasonable
representation.' Under the conflict rules of the Virginia Code of Professional
Conduct, the attomeywould not be able to represent a criminal defendant if she
intended to pursue these personal and career objectives without obtaining the
client's informed consen. Ethical and legal principles governing the conduct
of lawyers dearly prohibit defense attorneys from allowing these personal and
career considerations to affect their motion practice and sentence bargaining.
B. Cmideratim q e Inwts jFunae Cfw&
As described above, the maintenance of a positive, cordial relationship with
the prosecutors and judges in the criminal justice system, through less active and
less aggressive motion practice and sentence bargaining, can have a positive
impact on how an attorney's arguments are received bythe court and her ability
85. See VA. CODE ANN. S192-159 (Mlchie 2000) (setting out procedure by which judge
appoints counsel to .i ent criminal defendants); VA. CODE ANN. 5192-163.7 (MlNchie Supp. 2002)
(describing procedure for appointment of counsel in capital cases bypresiding judge).
86. Se HEMANN, s,~m note 3, at 61-69 (describing negative impact aggressive motion
practice can have on criminal defense attorney's professional relationship with prosecutors and
judges).
87. Blumberg, supra note 4, at 28.
88. Sa; ea, Uphoff, Zadms Adwazw supra note 13, at 425-31 (citing author's personal
experience and legal studies for proposition that most criminal defense attorneys are dedicated, avid
defenders of clients' interests).
89. See STANDARDS FOR QuM. JusT., s"pa note 2, Standard 4-3.5(a).
90. Swesupra notes 29-31, 59-60,73 and accompanying text.
91. Sees"mr notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
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to negotiate sentence agreements. 9 In this way, an attorney's future clients
potentially may benefit from an attorney's current cooperative motion practice
and sentence-bargaining techniques. Thus, an attorney's consideration of future
clients mayweigh in favor of the attorney adopting a more cordial, less vigorous
approach to motion practice and sentence bargaining in the representation of a
current client.9'
An extreme example, exceptionallyrare in practice, illustrates the impact of
this factor and allows for an evaluation of the legal and ethical validity of its
consideration. In a practice known as the "trade-out," the prosecutor and
defense attorney make an explicit deal whereby the defense attorney agrees to a
less than ideal plea agreement in one case in exchange for a very favorable plea
agreement in another case." This consideration of the future benefit of one
client at the expense of the diligent representation of another client is forbidden
bythe conflict rules unless the client consents after consultation.9 Less clear and
more common in practice are the following two situations: (1) where either the
prosecutor or the defense attorney references a prior, favorable sentence agree-
ment to which she agreed in an attempt to gain an advantage in the current
sentence negotiation or (2) where a defense attorney, representing a client with
a veryweak case, decides to forego an active and aggressive motion practice and
sentence-bargaining strategyin that case in the hope of fostering a better relation-
ship with the prosecutor and judge for future cases in which the client has a
better case. However, the same basic legal and ethical principles guide the
attorneys in these situations. Read together, the conflict rules of the Virginia
Rules of Professional Conduct stand for the proposition that when an attorney
represents multiple interests (i.e., the interests of current clients, former clients
and/or personal interests) that are directly adverse to one another or might
materially limit her ability adequatelyto represent both, the attomeyeither must
abandon one of the conflicting interests or must obtain the informed consent of
the client.' Thus, although an attorney's consideration of the interests of future
clients might not fall neatly into any of the categories established bythe conflict
rules, such a consideration creates a definite conflict and the attorney, therefore,
must not allow this consideration to affect her representation of the client
92. Sees" notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
93. See Uphoff, Effietw Nqiaw, sa*m note 17, at 90-93 (discussing benefit of cordial
relationship to future plea negotiations).
94. Alschuler,str note 84, at 1210-11.
95. A"trade-out" arrangement expressly is prohibited bythe V inia Rules of Professional
Conduct absent consent fromboth clients 'after consultation, u disclosures of the existence
and nature of all the claims or pleas involved." SeeVA. 1. PROF'L CO UCr P,. 1.8(g) (prohibiting
attorneys from negotiating "an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas unless
each client consents after consultation, including disclosure of the existence and nature of all the
claims or pleas involved").
96. Swsra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
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without obtaining the client's informed consent.' Thus, a criminal defense
attorney, absent informed consent from the client, should not allow consider-
ations of the interests of future or past clients to impact her motion practice or
sentence bargaining.
C Caderatic q'th Inrmts jthe Cnamt Client
Because the maintenance of a positive, cooperative relationship with
prosecutors and judges has been shown to improve the success of an attorney's
interactions with these individuals, the attomeyalso has an incentive to maintain
this cordial relationship in order to advance the interests of her current client."
Although it is clear that a criminal defense attorney not only may, but must,
consider the interests of the current client in deciding on motion practice and
sentence-barga n strategy, it is also clear that an attomeyhas a dutyof zealous
representation that extends to her motion practice and sentence bargaining."
Thus, an attorney's consideration of the current client's best interests presents
a much stronger argument for toning down the zealousness of representation
in favor of a more cooperative and less vigorous motion practice and sentence-
bargaining strategy than do the considerations of an attorney's personal and
career objectives and the interests of future clients. If a criminal defense attorney
could be certain that foregoing a vigorous motion practice and adopting a more
cooperative sentence-bargaining strategy would result in the best possible out-
come for the client, such measures would be ethically and legally justified.
However, given the grave uncertainties inherent in the criminal justice system and
especiallythe client's absolute authorityover plea decisions, such certaintyis not
possible. These uncertainties weigh especially heavy in the context of a capital
case where the adoption of this strategy could result in the client receiving a
death sentence without the preservation of important, viable issues for appeal.'t
97. Note that the broad definition of conflict adopted bythe Standards for CriminalJustice
would embodythe conflict that arises when an attomeytakes into account the consideration of the
interests of future clients and would require the attorney to disclose those interests to the client.
Ses"m notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
98. Legal scholars have suggested that a criminal defense attorney's maintenance of a positive
relationshp with the prosecutor and judge may have a positive impact on the attorney's ability to
accomplish the following: receive discovery, obtain cooperation and favorable rulings, avoid
harsher sentences at trial (although not directyapplicable in capital cases, could impact the judge's
willingness to set aside a jury's finding for ) and, most importantly, increase the chance of
reaching a sentence agreement. HEuMANN, sra note 3, at 61-75; se ao BOND, st"m note 22, S
4.19 (explaining that aggressive motion practice may irntate prosecutor and negatively impact
prosecutor's willingness to bargain with defense counsel).
99. Swsupra notes 29-31, 59-60 and accompanying tent
100. Defense counsel must make motions, both pre-trial and at trial, in order to preserve the
issue in the record for direct appeal and habeas corpus challenge. SwVA. SUP. Cr. R. 5:25 (stating
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In spite of these uncertainties, the decision to temper one's motion practice
and sentence-bargaining tactics for the purpose of obtaining a stronger sentence-
bargaining and trial position for the client appears to be a valid strategy for
representation when the attorney nscenMy believes that the adoption of this
strategy will serve the client's best interest.1 Although the legal and ethical
principles of representation arguably place strategy decisions such as this in the
hands of the attorney, the legal and ethical standards, at the veryleast, require the
attomeyto inform the client of her decision to adopt this strategyand to explain
to the client the implications of this strategy on her case. ' 2
V. 71 T yBeten Neg m Smegy and Maic Praaic
The choice of trial strategies is especially complicated and vexing in the
context of capital cases, which involve some of the most complex issues in
criminal defense work and place human lives at stake. Likewise, the choice of
strategy relating to motion practice and sentence bargaining is especiallyimpor-
tant in capital cases, in which it is essential for the attorney to file motions to
preserve issues for appeal and to attempt to remove the possibility of a death
sentence from the case through sentence agreements. The capital defender's job
is further complicated by the fact that the zealous undertaking of these two
essential aims are often at odds with one another. Legal scholars have suggested
that conducting an active and aggressive motion practice can affect adversely
both an attomey's abilityto negotiate a sentence agreement with the prosecutor
and her reception from the court."03 Other legal scholarship, however, suggests
that an aggressive motion practice mayincrease a prosecutor's incentive to reach
a sentence agreement with the attorney) ° Further, in the event that an attorney
is unable to reach a favorable outcome for the client in sentence negotiations or
at trial, her failure to conduct an active and aggressive motion practice can have
severe consequences on the defendant's appellate and habeas corpus prospects. 05
that claim of error must be made at trial with reasonable certainty in order for error to be assigned
to ruling of trial court); 28 U.S.C S 2264 (Supp. 2002) (stating that, except for three narrow
exceptions, federal district court will not consider claims of error unless they were raised and
d e on merits in state court).
101. The reasonableness standard is mandated bythe constitutional requirements established
in S&da&mnL Sees"r notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
102. Sersi'notes 34-43,61-63,75-79 (discussing allocation of decisionmaln authorityand
attorneys duty to communicate under Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, Standards for
Criminal Justice and Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
103. Sesmz notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
104. SeBOND, s"'m note 22, S 4.19 (noting that serious legal challenges and delays raised by
motions can result in more successful plea agreement); HEUMANN, sra note 3, at 73-74 (finding
that aggressive motion practice can encourage prosecutor to reach plea agreement to avoid burden
of addressing motions).
105. Seegwa/yMatthewK. Mahoney, Bri~gdxm z Dgau/ Clwsn 12 CAP.DEF.J. 305
(2000).
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Thus, it is essential for a capital defense attorneyto adopt a motion practice
and sentence-negotiation strategythat balances the client's interest in a vigorous
motion practice with her interest in the potential benefits obtained from the
attorney's adoption of a less aggressive strategy. Although the legal and profes-
sional standards provide an attorney the leeway to temper her motion practice
and sentence- bargaining tactics for the purpose of obtaining a stronger sentence-
bargaining and trial position when she reasonably believes that the adoption of
this strategywill serve the client's best interest, the question of when and to what
extent an attomeyshould utilize this strategy-when a client's best interest will be
served by adopting this strategy-remains unanswered."° Although this is a
determination that each individual attorneyntust make on the basis of the totality
of the facts and circumstances of the case and her prior experiences with the
prosecutor and judge in the case, general principles of negotiation and plea-
bargaining strategy provide some guidance for the attorney faced with this
determination.
Applying the principles of negotiation theory to the criminal context,
Professor Gifford recommends that attorneys attempt to balance their clients'
interest in a vigorous motion practice with their interest in a strong sentence-
bargaining position by adopting an integrated sentence-bargainiig strategy.07
Initially, Gifford advises, criminal defense attorneys should adopt a "competitive
strategy, but in a cooperative style.""~ Gifford provides four reasons for advo-
cating this approach. First, he contends that, because the government's initial
position is likelyto be especiallycompetitive given statutorilydetermined maxi-
mum sentences and its discretion to overcharge, the defense attorney faces the
risk of exploitation if she does not also adopt a competitive approach.'0 Second,
Gifford points to social science research indicating that parties with low bargain-
ing power, such as criminal defendants, fare better in negotiations br beginning
with a competitive strategyand shifting to a more cooperative style.1 Third, the
adoption of a competitive strategy initially demonstrates to the prosecutor that
the attorney is committed to the zealous representation of the client's interests
and will not "cave in" as a result of systemic pressures or personal interests.'
Finally, an earlycompetitive strategycan improve the attorney's relationship with
the client, who perceives this competitive strategy as a sign of the attorney's
commitment to her case."'
106. Sees"ra notes 29-33,98-102 and accompanying text.
107. See Gifford, sqim note 84, at 73-82.
108. Id at 79.
109. Id This is especially tre in capital cases where the prosecutor has an additional advan-
tage in being able to seek the ultimate penahty-a death sentence.
110. Id This rationale also has special significance in the context of capital cases, in which the
defendant generally has especially low bargaining power.
111. Idat79-80.
112. Id at 80.
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In advancing this competitive strategy, Gifford advises the attorneyactively
to seek discoveryfrom the prosecutor and vigorouslyto raise potential defenses,
motions and other issues favorable to the defense, all without giving the prosecu-
tor anyindication of the defendant's willingness to plead guilty."' Gifford warns,
however, that judges and prosecutors sometimes view such competitive tactics
with hostility"4 As a result, he recommends that attorneys pursue these tactics,
while simultaneously trying "to maintain a cooperative relationship with the
prosecutor" by raising the legal challenges informally, by placing responsibility
for the competitive tactics on the client and by adopting a cordial, accommoda-
tive personal style."' 5 However, in raising issues informally, it is essential that the
defense attorney preserve issues for appeal by introducing the issues into the
record."1 6 One method of raising issues less contentiously, while at the same time
preserving them for appeal, is to raise the issue in a motion but waive argument
on the motion.H
Following the initial stages of sentence bargaining, Gifford recommends
that the criminal defense attorney transition into a cooperative strategy."'
Gifford suggests that this transition is appropriate for the following reasons:
(1) the prosecutor will probably use a competitive strategy,
(2) the prosecutor has greater bargaining power,
(3) an amicable contiin relationship between the defense attorney
and the prosecutor should be maintained;
(4) various pressures to reach agreement exist; and
(5) the prevail ng norms in plea bargaining mandate the use of cooper-
ative tactics."
9
Although Gifford contends that in the typical case negotiation theory suggests
that an initiallycompetitive approach developing into a cooperative approach will
be most effective, he warns that "the defense attorney should always determine
the factors that distinguish the instant case from the usual plea bargaining situa-
113. Gifford, s"gma note 84, at 80.
114. Id
115. Id at 80-81. Gifford emphasizes the difference between an attorney's negotiation
strategy, involving the tactics employed and the types of arguments made, and an attorney's
personal style, involving the manner and tone with which an attorneyinteracts with the other party.
Id at 81.
116. Seesqra note 100 and accompanying text.
117. This approach is best suited for issues against which the appellate courts have expressly
ruled and no novel agument or approach is advocated (e.g., a motion to declare the Virginia capital
murder statutes unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and
unusual punishment).
118. Gifford, supra note 84, at 81.
119. Id
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Although it is clear that Blumberg was correct in asserting that a criminal
defense attorney is confronted with a wide array of considerations that place
pressure on the attorneyto settle cases and that a vast majority of criminal cases
do in fact settle, his conclusion that criminal defense attorneys abandon their
duty of zealous representation in favor of systemic pressures and personal
considerations is based only on anecdotal and theoretical analysis. Blumberg's
analysis is flawed because it fails to acknowledge the value of a favorable plea
agreement to the criminal defendant and to examine the full range of factors
contributing to an attorney's decision to seek a plea agreement. To the extent
that a criminal defense attorneys decision to abandon her duty of zealous
representation in favor of the pursuit of a plea agreement is dictated by personal
and career considerations or the interests of future clients, Blumberg's criticism
is apposite; an attorney is prohibited ethically and legally by professional stan-
dards from allowing such considerations to impact her representation of clients.
More frequently, however, a criminal defense attorney's decision to tone
down the zealousness of her representation is a legitimate strategy toward
reaching a plea agreement. For manydefendants, obtaining a plea agreement will
result in a shorter sentence and the avoidance of a lengthy and uncertain trial
process. This is especiallytrue in the context of capital cases, in which a sentence
agreement generally entails the removal of the possibility of a death sentence
from the case. In these cases in which the client's best interest is served by
obtaining a favorable sentence agreement, the criminal defense attorney is
justified in adopting a more cooperative and less adversarial representation
strategy when she reasonably believes that such a strategy will prove the most
effective for achieving the desired result. However, the attorney is obligated
ethically and legally to inform the client of this strategy and to advise the client
of the potential impact of such a strategy. Further, because there are a myriad of
factors outside the control of the attorney, the attorney can not be certain that
this strategy will be effective and thus must take precautions to ensure that the
adoption of a less vigorous approach to the representation will not significantly
harm the defendant if the desired result is not obtained.
Criminal defense attorneys thus are faced with the unenviable position of
attempting to formulate a strategythat will preserve a strong negotiating position
with the prosecutor, while at the same time fulfilling her duties as a zealous
advocate for her client. In the context of a capital case, in which the pressure to
settle the case is often even more profound and the penaltyfor failing activelyto
file motions especially severe, the attorney must adopt a motion practice and
120. Id at 82.
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plea-negotiation strategy that balances the client's interest in a vigorous motion
practice with her interest in the potential benefits obtained from the attorney's
adoption of a less aggressive strategy. Although the development of this strategy
is determined largelybythe individual facts and environment of the case, negotia-
tion and plea-bargaining principles suggest that a client's interests often will be
best served by an attomeywho enters sentence negotiations with a competitive
negotiation strategy, but a cordial personal style, and transitions over the course
of the negotiations into a more cooperative style.
